1st Counterintelligence Team Phu Bai Early in December 1967, the 1st CIT, located at Phu Bai began to receive reports that the Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) were planning a major offensive to take place early in 1968. To sort out these reports, the team continued to evaluate various sources of information to identify "revolutionary rhetoric" and "propaganda" from factual strategic intelligence which might predict possible enemy action in the northern areas of South Vietnam. The fact that the Viet Cong were experts in providing confusing and misleading information, made the task more difficult. It was pointed out one day by SSgt Glasgow to Sgt Flanigan, that "the 1st CIT was in fact putting together a great deal of information from various CI sources that indeed supported reports that the enemy was readying itself for a major offensive into South Vietnam. Working off of a large Situation Map of I Corps TAOR, SSgt Glasgow had placed pins in those areas where NVA Main Forces and VC units activity had been reported. In many cases, continued reporting confirmed that the enemy was in fact in these areas and readying itself for battle. In addition, SSgt Glasgow had plotted the possible locations of NVA mortar and 122mm rocket unit movements for the past several months. Base on his findings, SSgt Glasgow was convinced that NVA and VC forces were moving in the direction of key cities in the area - specifically Hue and Phu Bai which were now in easy rocket range. SSgt Glasgow brought the information to the attention of Lt. Flanigan, who - along with other intelligence collection - pass it immediately to General Westmoreland's Headquarters. In response to this intelligence gathered by SSgt Glasgow, General Westmorland ordered both the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division into Phu Bai ( just in time for the start of the Tet Offensive). Given the strength of NVA forces at the time, Flanigan strongly believes, "it would have been extremely difficult for the 1st Marine Division to maintain control of both Phu Bai and Da Nang." This was mainly due to the fact that Marine forces were spread out over an area of some 1100 square miles. Also at this time, the 3rd Marine Division was busy in the Khe Sanh area and in the northernmost sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) of I Corps. In December, the 1st CIT had completed a partial debrief of a NVA LtCol, who had given some details of a major NVA attack being planned against both Hue and Phu Bai. Due to the matter at hand, the NVA LtCol was sent to the Province headquarters for further interrogation . Details of that debriefing did not reach the team until after the offensive had gotten underway. During the latter part of December 1967 and into the early part of January 1968, the 3rd Counterintelligence Team debriefed a captured NVA Colonel, who was a Hoi Chanh rallier. At the time of capture, the officer had a map in his possession, which included some details of an attack that identified one of the southern attack routes that the enemy had planned to take into Da Nang. However, due to the information being classified F-6 (Unknown source of unknown reliability) it was put aside for future use. This infornmation proved to be very reliable. At the same time, the 5th CIT was receiving reports of the impending attack from another captured NVA Officer that was being interrogated. During the interrogation, the NVA Officer gave information about the upcoming attack on Da Nang. As the interrogation continued, it was also noted that the officer was part of a NVA patrol collecting information for one of the NVA assault forces in the area. GySgt G. Kimbler, a member of the 5th CIT, noted, "in December of 1967, we were receiving so many reports of a imminent attack that the higher-ups at heqdquarters seamed to down play the credibility of the information, where our reports had been set aside without further action. All indicators of an attack were present, and further reporting continued to gave us evidence that the enemy was repositioning supplies and materials in the northern area of III Corps. There was so much activity taking place at the time, it was very hard to check it out for its credibility, etc.". At approximately at the same time that the Tet Offensive was being planned by the NVA, both the NVA and VC continued to put secondary pressure on the main lines of communications (MLOC) throughout I Corps. Particularly, Highway #1 from Na Nang up to the Hai Van pass; through Phu Loc to Phu Bai; and from Hue and north to Quang Tri/Dong Ha. Later it was determined that pressure on these areas were due to a vital land link for movement of supplies and heavy materials, along with fuel, ammunition and other equipment that were needed by those NVA forces entering the South. To add further pressure to this problem, the north/south convoy routes for the transportation of allied supplies were straddled and were supported by the numerous CAPs, PF/RF and larger units emplacement along these routes. The 15th CIT in the far North, the 1st and 5th CIT at Phu Bai and at Da Nang ran continuous liaison and collection efforts to aided in keeping Highway #1 open. Many efforts at identifying, locating and neutralizing the VC infrastructure assisted Marine combat patrols that both surprise and thwarted local enemy attacks on bridges etc., denied the NVA with intelligence and in its collection effort. 11th Counterintelligence Team The 11th CIT, stationed at the Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneoke Bay, Hawaii, supported the 1st Marine Brigade and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC), Headquarters. The 11th CIT was commanded by Captain Bill Mentzer. Other officers of the Team included: Warrant Officers (WOs) Bill Lee, Wayne D. Wilgrube and Pat Lynch. The Team Chief was MSgt Bill Hamby. Some of the 11th CIT members were sent to the 3rd CIT in South Vietnam as replacement personnel during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Late 1967 At Camp Pendleton, California, Captain Sam Moyer recalled that "during this period the 13th Counterintelligence Team included, Mac "Motherflether!" McClenithan, Bill Lantz and Audie Bromley were Warrant Officers. Tex Mattocks and Jim Hale were Staff Sergeants. Tom Brorowitz, Denny McClain and Denny Braun were all Sergeants." At the time, the Team participated in "Operation Aligator Hide" -a full blown brigade size maneuver exercise held way up at the northern end of Camp - in the early summer 1967. The exercise had hamlets and villages - with Marines as actors - and the whole works." Significantly, it also had a very major counterintelligence role written into the scenario play. Somehow, the Team Chief and the participating sub team kept Moyer from making an ass out of himself and the CI effort. Eventually, CI identified the major players of the hostile "infrastructure" and were able to take them out. In fact, CI got an at-a-boy from General Regan Fuller, the Brigade CG, for its outstanding performance." January 1968 1st Counterintelligence Team: During the early part of January 1968, the main supply route, along with many of the Combine Arms Platoons (CAPs) positions were probed by enemy forces. Some of the probes developed into full scale ground attacks against the CAP positions. On January 7, 1968, Hotel 5 (A CAP in Phu Loc District) was over ran and both a Michael R. Roha and Steve Nelson (Marine Corporals) were taken prisoners by the attacking forces. Immediately, the 1st CIT ran a MIA case on the two Marines, and on the 21 January 1968, the two Marines were returned. At the time, it wasn't sure if the two Marines had escaped or were released for a propaganda gesture. During the initial debriefing , there were indications - though not recorded - that the two might have been forces to either make or sign some sort of propaganda material. On 23 January 1968, a Marine that was listed as a MIA was returned and turned over to the Team for questioning. Through the questioning it had appeared the the Marine was captured when a CAP unit he was assigned to was over-ran (12 May 1967). Upon his release, he was wearing a red banner and it was speculated that he used it for propaganda purposes while in custody of the emeny. On 31 January 1968, the main communist forces from several of the People"s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) formed the Tri-Thien-Hue Front readied themselves for combat. Prior to launching the attack, NVA artillery and rocket forces bombarded the Marine compound at Phu Bai where the 1st CIT was located. Phu Bai was rocketed and mortared regularly. Many of the CAP (Hotel CAPs 5,6,7,and 8) compounds of the 3rd Combined Action Group (CAG) were over-run, some completely destroyed. Shortly after the offensive began, contact between the 1st CIT at Phu Bai and one of its sub-teams at Phu Loc - which had came under a strong ground assault - became lost. Also, a short time thereafter, communications between Team Headquarters and Hue City were lost. During the early morning hours on 1 February, the Phu Loc District Headquarters was over-run by one of the VC main force regiments. Sgt Wallick recalled that, "the CAP's south of the our position had called for artillery support around 2300 hours the previous night, due to being overrun by a NVA battalion size force. The reaction force scrambling to assist the CAPs were blocked from moving south due to a large VC force hindering their advance. The ARVN 105mm Artillery Battery that was providing fire support to the CAP, began to receive activity within their perimeter wire. Immediately, illumination was called for. This showed that the VC were placing bangalore torpedoes in the wire and that a battalion plus of VC/NVA had already assembled on Route #1 in preparation for an assault on the Headquarters. Once the assault began, the ARVN PF/RF company size force at the District Headquarters were completely overwhelmed. The CI sub-team, along with what was left of the MACV advisory team, broke out of their location and moved cross country for several days until reaching Marine artillery positions at the Mougia Pass. The Phu Loc District headquarters was overrun and completely destroyed. Though the action was heavy at time, no CI Team members at either Phu Bai or Phy Loc were reported missing in action. However, in Hue City it was a difference story. Chief Warrant Officer-2 Soloman Godwin who was assigned to the Thua Thien Province - acting as a National Police Advisor in the city - was taken prisoner by the NVA invasion forces on 5 February 1968. (CWO Godwin's acts of gallantry, subsequent capture and death has been placed in its own section of this Oral CI history - "One of Us - One Will Miss".) The activities of the 1st CIT from January 31, 1968 through March 1968 constrated around regular trips to the CAP outpost, interrogation of a steady stream of POW's, Chieu Hoi's, VCI, etc... gathering intelligence during a chaotic period. As one of the 1st CIT put it, "we were all suffering from fatigue...long hours...and very little sleep." However, during the battle for Hue, the 1st CIT ran a number of recovery operations, trying to pick up stragglers that became separated from their units; identification of possible MIA/KIA: and collect perishable intelligence. In one case, the Team turned a double agent in the national police and recruited him to go back behind the VC lines in the city to locate the NVA Headquarters. Several days later - as reports indicated - when he reported back to the team, he informed the team commander that "the main headquarters was located in a pagoda on the outskirts of the city - a raiding party was organized utilizing PRUs. The raid took place a short time afterwards. The raiding party consisted of twenty-eight individuals. Once the raid was launched and until its conclusion, only 6 of its original members were able to reach friendly lines. Upon their return, the 6 survivers were debriefed by 1st CIT. It was concluded that a number of 2nd and 3rd echelon NVA staff personnel had been killed and a large portion of the NVA General Staff still remained intact. The reason for the NVA General Staff remaining intact was due to the constant shelling and ongoing battle inside the City - it caused the staff to constantly changed its base of operations. During the first few days of the Tet Offensive, the only strong point left on the road was the Voice of America Transmitter site, which was manned by Sgt Bender, a CI Marine from NAD. Once the Marine units entered the battle from the south, and subsequently into the City, CI personnel started searching for possible MIAs like CWO Godwin and others. GySgt Maddox told the story of driving a M37 truck down the back streets utilizing a couple of Nungs as guides and searching building for US personnel. They came across a number of US Army personnel, mostly clerks that had been scattered in one building. There hands had been bound and many were shot at close range. Maddox along with the Nungs met the second 5th Marines convoy headed into the MACV compound just prior to crossing the river and reported that NVA/VC had setup an ambush in a building just ahead of them. A Marine Ontos - a small tracked vehicle that was outfitted with six 105mm recoilless rifles (3 on each side) - was called upon and destroyed the building, scattering the NVA troops inside. After the building was destroyed the convoy entered into the city. 15th Counterintelligence at Dong Ha was commanded by Captain Sam Moyer during January 1968. Captain Moyer said that "he had a bunch of interesting characters, to include: Both Nine and Ten fingers Brown and I.G. Shell - who were Lieutenants; Strech Cordell, Jack Kelly, Rich Hansen and Charlie Wright - who were Warrants; GySgt Jim Coyne was Team Chief most of the time, SSgt/Sgt Wayne Wildgrube, Jim Deshotel, Dan Jasinski, Joe Kirkpatrick, Steve Creadon,Dutch Geiselman, Eddie Salmon, John Struber, Ken Cohen, Dean Kone, Greg Grajewski and Jim Orr. (To get the full flavor of Captains Sam Moyer involvement during this period - See the separate section entitled "Through These Eyes With Counterintelligence."). Like the 1st CIT, the 15th CIT found its assets spread out and that they were cut off from Dong Ha as the Tet Offensive got under way. The sub-teams of the 15th CIT were located at Khe Shah, Dong Ha, Cam Lo, Cua Viet and Quang Tri. 1stLt Shell at the time was assigned to train and was responsible for all operations conducted by the Montagnard Community. These people were seen by the Viet Cong and North Vietnames and within some sectors of South Vietnam as outcasts. Many CI operations were conducted along with the Montagnard people and were quite successful. Also at the time, the 15th CIT provided operational support to those Naval Gun Boats operating on the rivers near the DMZ. The sub-team stationed out at Cam Lo District consisted of 1st Lt Rick Hansen, sub-team Commander, along with "Dutch" Geiselman, Dan Jasinski, Eddie Salmon and Steve "Shakey" Creadon. During the night of 2 February, the NVA mounted a regimental ground attack on the Camo Lo District compound. The attack lasted for hours, and there was strong evidence that a second NVA regiment had been summoned to help. There were a number of breaches in the wall, along with hand to hand fighting in some areas where the breaches had occurred. There were a lot of heroics that night, not only by the DIOCC personnel, but by the CI Marines who had moved into the compound earlier that night when all the villagers began abandoning their homes and disappearing. To his everlasting anguish, Lt. Hansen was at Team Headquarters that night. The After Action Report had reveal that, "During the early morning hours, the Cam Lo District Headquarters came under heavy mortar, rocket, recoilless rifle attack which was followed by automatic weapons fire and eventually a ground attack by a reinforced North Vietnamese army regiment. When the attack commenced, Sergeant Jasinski unhesitatingly moved through the fire swept area to a 60mm mortar position. Suddenly, several enemy mortar rounds impacted in the emplacement and surrounding area, wounding him, and destroying the mortar's base plate, sight and tripod and detonated those rounds still in the pit. Disregarding his own safety, Jasinski moved into the burning mortar position, salvaging the undamaged mortar tube and established a firing position in an open area. Although he had to pull the tube out of the ground after every fired round, he resolutely delivered approximately 200 mortar rounds against the assaulting North Vietnamese force. Once the mortar ammunition had been exhausted, he quickly moved into the command bunker, to assist in reestablishing communications and treated the wounded. A short time thereafter, he returned to the perimeter and repeatedly exposed himself to hostile fire to obtain and distribute ammunition to Marines and assist the casualties. Also, during the same time as Jasinski was putting mortar rounds on the advancing enemy, Steve Creadon was positioned on a elevated .50 caliber machine gun platform. The crew of two had been killed. Creadon was trying to fire the gun by himself without assistance and was blown off the platform by a RPG-2. Steve was knocked unconscious and blown back into the middle of the compound where he lay until someone was able to drag him into the command bunker - That's where he picked up the name "Shakey." This was steve's second or thirds purple heart, and he began to develop trembling hands and an occasional stutter after this episode. Dutch Geiselman was shot in the leg early in the action, and spent most of the time in the command bunker helping to hold down the confusion. As a result of their prompt and fearless actions during the five hour battle, the small number of defenders repulsed the superior enemy force, killing 144, capturing 38 NVA soldiers and seizing numerous individual and crew served weapons. The four CI Marines at Cam Lo were all decorated. Dan Jasinski received the Silver Star and Purple Heart; Eddie Salmon the Bronze Star, Steve Ceardon the Bronze Star and Purple Heart and Dutch Geiselman received the Navy Commendation Medal and Purple Heart. In other areas of northern South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive, the NVA attacked Hill 861A on 5 February 1968 and were repulsed. On 7 February, an NVA regiment attacked and overran the Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei some five miles west of Khe Sanh. The attack saw 9 PT-76 Amphibious Tanks being utilized by the NVA against the Camp. During the attack, the Camp utilized LAWs against the advancing PT-76 tanks. Several PT-76 Tanks were destroyed or damaged. Once the ground assault began and the NVA began to penetrated the perimeter of the Camp, friendly artillery fire was ordered into the Camp. As the NVA advanced further into the Camp's perimeter, the camps occupants form into several groups. On order a prearranged E&E; plan was put into effect with the CAP - a short distance away - as the primary rally point. The CAP platoon over a mile away, was located closer to Khe Sanh, than the Special Forces Camp. According to Sergeant Potter2 a member of the CAP platoon noted that "during the attack, the CAP provided illumination and HE mortar fire in its effort to maintain a ground link with the CIDG camp at Lang Vei until it was overran by the NVA." CI personnel from the 15th CIT, who were positioned at the Khe San Combat Base, had maintained liaison with the CAP prior to the Tet Offensive. Both the CAP and CI had reported large scale NVA troop movements and preparatory activity in the surrounding area prior to the actual attack taking place. The CAP compound was utilized as a vehicle to meet with local sources and villagers who were being dispatched across the tri-border area to collect intelligence. Once the offensive began contact with local sources became sporadic. Once the Special Forces Camp had been overrun by the NVA, the NVA then directed its attention at the CAP. The NVA wasted little time. Under heavy pressure and with the support of Marine artillery, the CAP received orders to evacuate the site and fall back to the Khe San Combat Base. Having gained important ground, the NVA had freedom of movement and in doing so had effectively cut off a large part of the local intelligence sources from CIT. As time continued onward, the 15th CIT sub-team at Khe San reestablished contact with the Breu mountain tribesmen, who had been previously recruited by the CAP, Special Forces and CI to assist in the intelligence collection effort. The Breu tribesmen became a major source of bomb damage assessment (BDA) reporting. During each of the B-52 bombing (ARCLIGHT) runs, which were flown against NVA units in and around the Khe Sanh area, the tribesmen would be dispatched after each bombing run to collect and report the amount of damage, if any, caused by these flights. The tribesman would also report the locations of NVA units around Khe San where bombing runs could be later scheduled. 5th CIT and 3rd CIT located in the Da Nang TOAR As the battle of Hue City continued, both the 5th and 3rd CIT received a steady stream of low level intelligence source reporting which had predicted that a major offensive was imminent. Many of the reports collected by the CI team in the north were too good to be true. In one report the 5th CIT received indications that a VC main force (battalion size) was maneuvering itself into position forattacks on the Nam Oh Village area and a bridge on highway #1, located north of Red Beach. A few days proir to the Tet Offensive, the VC battalion size unit had been caught in the open along the Da Nang River by ARVN forces. As Gene Kimber remembers, "After the battle, the ARVN were stacking bodies like cord wood; the total body count exceeded well over hundred VC killed." An interesting sidelight: During the first few days of the Tet Offensive, III MAF Headquarters came under ground attack from a local VC unit which had tried to penetrate the Headquarters defensive wire. In the morning, one of the dead VC pulled from the wire was identified as General Cushman's personal barber. On 31 January 1968, the 2nd NVA Division - along with two Local Force Battalions and several Local Force companies - launched a series of attacks south of Da Nang, reconnaissance patrols which were operating in the area called for artillery strikes on the 2nd NVA Division as it made its approach towards the Marine Air Facility, Marble Mountain. At the same time, the 7th Marines were engaged with the 31st VC Regiment west of An Hoa. Once the NVA Division began to engage the air facility, the attackers used long-range mortars to assist in its advance and picked-up its attack against the ARVN 51st Regiment which was between the NVA division and the air facility. In order to protect the main approaches leading into Da Nang, several CAPs, along with the 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines and 3rd Bn, 5th Marines, were assigned to protect these approaches and serve as a reaction force. To assist Marine forces, both the 3rd and 5th CIT were to provide needed assistance and maintain continued liaison with National Police and local intelligence agencies. In one particular case, a CAP unit that was south of the Da Nang River and Da Nang Airfield had been overrun and was forced to withdraw to another CAP unit closer to Da Nang. Gene Kimbler remembered, "I was part of a composite CI sub-team along with several other CI Marines that had been directed to join the reaction force to relieve the CAP unit closest to Da Nang Airfield. Once the CAP was relieved, we were to run possible MIA cases, VCI source, and work intelligence issues. The CI sub-team drove from Red Beach in a M-38 jeep, heading southward in an effort to link-up with the reaction force. Linking-up with the reaction force presentated a problem due to the advance of enemy forces. Trying to complete the task, they continued down a parallel road towards the reaction forces location - not knowing that the reaction force had walked into a VC ambush. As things turned out, the sub-team managed to reestablished liaison with the CAP unit with the assistance of the local village and hamlet officials. This reestablished liaison proved important because it provided current intelligence on the NVA combat order of battle and clarified if any MIA personnel had been sighted." Like the Marine CI teams further north, the teams located at Da Nang began to fill in those intelligence gaps and were able to identify large portions of the Viet Cong infrastructure supporting the Tet Offensive. This information was still being exploited by late 1968, which provided for the identity of many local, district and province level VCIs supporting the North. Individuals that were identified that were not already captured were added to the "Black List" for targeting and neutralization. Circumstances Surrounding the Capture and Subsequent Death of CWO2 Soloman GODWIN Solomon Godwin was born 24 January 1935 in Hot Springs National Park, Arkansas. After his high school years at Pine Bluff Senior High School he chose to enlist in the Marine Corps Reserve. In January of 1956 he was discharged from the reserves and immediately enlisted in the regular Marine Corps. During his first enlistment Codwin was trained as a Photographic Interpretation Specialist and later became a Counterintelligence Specialist. On 1 October 1966, he was appointed a Warrant Officer and was assigned as a Counterintelligence Officer - 0210 MOS.
On 16 January 1968, he was assigned as the Counterintelligence Liaison Officer to the National Police Headquarters, Hue City, Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) When the TET Offensive began on 31 January 1968, the residence which WO Godwin occupied had been under siege for 5 days until his initial capture by the invading communist forces into Hue City. During the battle for Hue City, the city remained in enemy hands for 5 days before the invading forces were dislodged by Marines. Throughout the battle for the City, close hand-to-hand combat was a daily occurance which reduced much of the City to rubble. WO Godwin status - originally reported missing in action (MIA) on 10 February - was changed from MIA to a Prisoner of War (POW) that was based on information provided by two US Army returnees who had escaped enemy capture during their return and subsequent interrogation. Events leadng to Godwin's Capture During the Tet Offensive, reports revealed that WO Godwin had managed to piece together a functioning radio from several non-operational radios in order to establish communication with US forces. Once the radio was operational, he personally directed air, mortar and artillery fires onto the advancing communist forces entering the city. Just prior to his capture, Godwin transmitted his coordinates to friendly forces in order to direct mortar fire onto his position in an effort to scale back the emeny advance approaching his location. During the mortar barrage, WO Godwin sustained shrapnel wounds. Reports further noted that immediately upon the lifting of the mortar attack, an NVA assault force rushed into his position and he with others were subsequently captured. It should be noted that just prior to Godwin's capture, he along with four other National Police personnel, had managed to kill 12 of the enemy intruders. He also managed to destroy all weapons, files and sensitive documents to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Several days later, once the city fell into the hands of the Marines, Godwin's CI credentials were found hidden in a mattress in his residence. His last radio transmission was heard at approximately 1400 hours, 5 February 1968. Immediately after his capture, WO Godwin was taken to a enemy medical facility for treatment. On the next day, 6 February 1968, he was moved to a location where other US POW's had been positioned within the city. Two days later, the captured POWs - (February 8, 1968) were moved on a 20 hour trek to an mountainous area, west of the Phu Bai airfield. It's believed that upon their arrival (WO Godwin and others) at this location they were joined by other POWs approximately 15 US and 30 ARVN. In this group of POW was Hue city's head of CAS/CORD(CIA Station Chief), several US Army airborne NCOs and two civilian medical missionaries3, a Marjorie Nelson and Sandra Johnson. (The two women were captured on 1 February 1968 and were released 31 March 1968). About half the group of POWs were wounded and in need of medical treatment. An Army NCO, who later escaped, related that "during the forced march out of the city, they were moved down a VC/NVA supply route at night before they reached their next stop." Reports further indicated, that approximately 13 kilometers outside the city, a high level Viet Cong political cadre had held a summary court on the CORDS chief demanding he sign a written confession that had been prepared earlier, for his involved actions against the People of North Vietnam. The COORD Chief refused to sign the document and was executed chinese style - kneeling with his hands tied behind their back, and shot in the back of the head. As the column of POWs moved further away from Hue City, it was noticed that there was a decrease of guard personnel. This caused a lapse in security and increased the opportunity for the POWs to escape. During one debriefing conducted by the 1st CIT, it was noted that a Army NCO, along with others POWs, had drawn up a "Lets Jump the Guards Plan". The two women missionarie POWs that were with the group were also informed of the plan and told "That there was going to be shooting." The plan never materalized because the women immediately informed the guards of the plan. Because of this, additional guards to guard the POWs arrived. A short time thereafter, the POWs were given footware, blindfolded and bound for movement towards the Ashau Village. Footwear was taken from all POWs at each camp site - this was to make travel harder in the event of escape. On 19-20 February 1968, WO Godwin, along with the other POWs, were moved to an unknown location. It is believed that between 20 February 1968 and the latter part of April 1968, WO Godwin's wounds had worsened and to reduce the pain, was given some unknown medication. While at a POW camp site, all POWs were checked every two hours and the guards were changed every two hours - this was to discourage (guard/POW) fraternization, etc. Movement of POWs within a camp site were in groups of 7 to 10 POWs at a time, with a guard at the front and rear of the formation. When POWs were moved from one camp site to another, the camp that was to receive them would be completely emptied - this was a commin practice used by the VC. On 1 May 1968, WO Godwin along with the other POW's, began movement to another camp site. WO Godwin's condition grew worse. Due to the lack of proper medical attention, WO Godwin became increasingly weak and on the verge of passing out. The wounds to his lower legs and feet grew worse - he begin to feel no pain. Because of not feeling any pain to this feet, he was able to continue the trek to the new camp site on foot. The new camp site was some five days off. During travel to the new site, reports indicated that "WO Godwin had difficulty traversing hills and obstacles during the march to the new camp site." Because of the number of days required to get to the new camp site, the POW's had stopped for a period of approximately three days in a mountain area that was controlled by the Vietnamese Montagnards. It was also apparent that WO Godwin's condition to his legs and feet had developed into gangrene. On 6 May 1968, the POW's arrived at the new camp site. Upon arrival at the new POW camp site, all the POW's names were entered into the camps control ledger. The approximate number of POW's at this camp were two U.S and 25 ARVN's. WO Godwin's condition grew progressively worse and his captore gave him several more injection, believed to be vitamins, to give him strength. On 25 July 1968 during the continued march northward towards, another POW camp site, WO Godwin died on the stretcher and was pronounced dead. Because of WO Godwin's unselfishness and professionalism to duty during his action prior to his initial capture he was awarded the Silver Star for Gallantry.4
1st CIT (Phu Bai) Around the middle of April 1968, the 1st CIT ran a MIA body ID case on a US Army Staff Sergeant whose body was found during the uncovering of several mass graves in and around Hue City. The investigation revealed that the SSgt had both of his hands tied behind him and had been buried alive along with several hundred other vietnamese men, woman and children. Over three thousand vietnamese civilians, who had been identified by the VC to be associated with the South Vietnamese Government, were executed doing the Tet Offensive of Hue City. During the latter part of April 1968, a 1st CIT confidential sources - rated B-2 -reported that he had located 2 Viet Cong battalions, one was west of Hue and the other north of Phu Bai in a coastal area. Working on this information, the 1st CIT processed the information forward and within hours several Marine ground units had encircled the VC. The VC were pounded for three days by a combination of artillery and air strikes. A NVA Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) was the senior man left in command when the remanent of the battalions were captured. Sixty wounded and approximately thirty-four shell shocked VC were evacuated to "A" Med at Phu Bai, where CIT personnel assisted ITT in the screening and interrogation process. Sergeants Jesmore and Brillant were screening a young Vietnames woman, along with the teams interpretor SSgt Hung. After talking to the woman for a while, they became aroused. The young woman said that prior to the beginning of the Tet Offensive, she had been attending school in Hue City and was on vacation visiting relatives, prior to her capture. SSgt Hung, ask the young woman, "What are you studying in school?". The young woman replied, "French." "Ok" Hung replied and ask her what was the meaning of a simple French word. She did not know the meaning and it was finally determined that she couldn't speak elementry French. As the screening process lead into the interrogation phase, Sergeant Jesmore noted that, "it was finally determined that the female was a VCI and later identified by other POWs of being a VCI Combo Liaison guide, who was leading the VC battalion through the area." During the latter part of April, the 1st CIT ran a case on a Vietnames political appointee, who had been employed at Marine Air Group-36's, Industrial Labor Office. On several occasions, the individual was observed at various times of the day, paceing off the various distances from the Group's living quarters, ammunition dump, fuel dump and other key facilities in the Group's area, while the aircraft were being readied for flight. Also noted was that when the mortar attach on the Group's compound had occurred, the individual was no where to be found. He was eventually taken into custody and when he was subsequently interrogated, admitted that he was an agent for the Viet Cong. May 1968 In order to have a active pool of qualified Marine CI personnel onhand in the event that the Vietnam War might spread throughout South-East Asia, the 10th, 12th and 14th Reserve CI Teams were formed. The original proposal to create the Reserve CITs had been presented to HQMC, INTC by CWO Davison. Many Marine CI personnel who were released from active duty, joined these Reserve CI units. The 10th and 12th CITs are located at the Anacostia Naval Air Station, Washington, DC. The 14th CIT are located at the Miramar Naval Air Station, Miramar, CA. The Reserve CI Teams mirrored their active duty counterparts in both organization and operational equipment requirements. On several occasions, individuals from the Reserve CI Teams, volunteered for active duty and participated in Vietnam up until 1973. August 1968 During late summer of 1968, the 15th CIT sent a sub-team into the Cua Valley to be attached to a U.S Army Special Forces "A" Team - looking at a Vietnam Map, the location would be near a village called "Mai Loc". At the time, the 15 CIT was short of personnel within its four sub-teams throughout the Quang Tri area. The sub-team sent to the U.S Army Special Forces was composed of Lt. I.G. Shell, "Ski" Grajewski (who had just extended for a year), and Corporal Long, the sub-teams interpreter. The sub-team knew the area quite well having worked the area on several occasions and had a collection of various sources. Both had eventually worked out a mutual agreement to support and exchange raw intelligence. Several weeks had passes and one day the Marine CI sub-team climbed into a "deuce and a half" (2 1/2 ton cargo truck) along with some of the Army Special Forces. They were making a run into Dong Ha. The road leading from the Army Special Forces Compound was extremely treacherous, not because of its condition - snaking down the side of a canyon - but due to the probability that mines had been layed by the enemy. This was often the case. Lt. Shell, along with Ski sitting in the front seat of the vehicle with the driver. Corporal Long, along with some of the Special Forces personnel was sitting in the bed of the vehicle, when they s |
